Menu Content/Inhalt
Главная arrow Publications arrow Economy arrow Pestushko Y.S. The unknown pages of the japanese espionage (1906-1917)
Pestushko Y.S. The unknown pages of the japanese espionage (1906-1917) Печать E-mail
10.01.2013 г.

&The unknown pages of the japanese espionage (1906-1917)

Y.S. Pestushko

The Japanese foreign intelligence service was set up in the middle of the 19th century. Until then there was no need in spying abroad, because Japan was practically a closed country. At the same time, the experience in domestic spying (when even the movement of people in the country was strictly controlled) enabled the government by the end of the 19th century to organize rather quickly espionage in China, Korea and the Russian Far East - the areas, which became an object of the Japanese interests [1]. The Japanese agents were sent to these regions in order to study the state of affairs in the mainland, and later - to make a reconnaissance of the potential theatre of military operations against Russia. In order to coordinate the activity of the Japanese agents, who collected information, the government set up various societies and organizations. Thus, in 1899 the East-Asian society of cultural unity (To-a-dobunkai) was founded under the auspice of the Japanese General Staff. Its tasks included (besides assessing the prospects of the Japanese emigration) the study of geographical characteristics, national peculiarities and traditions of the Asian countries. The major foreign branch of this organization settled down in Peking, in the building of the Japanese embassy. Soon other branches of the society appeared in Inner and Outer Mongolia, Indochina, Siam, India. Among the members of the society were not only officers and rank-and-file of the Japanese army, but also ordinary Japanese, who lived abroad and knew the local languages and traditions [2]. At the same time two similar Japanese societies were set up; officially they studied the prospects of the Japanese emigration in the Asia-Pacific region, but in reality they were spying. These were: the Pacific cooperation (Taiheiyo kyokai) and the Pacific Ocean (Taiheiyo) [3].

By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese agents infiltrated nearly all the significant points in Manchuria and Korea, creating a wide net of espionage, where under the mask of salesmen, photographers, hairdressers, owners of hotels and brothels worked regular officers of the Japanese army [4]. The experience of the Russo-Japanese war clearly showed, that Russian counter-intelligence couldn't effectively act against the Japanese agents because of poor organization of its work. Evidently, the Russian General Staff should have taken necessary measures to prepare its own secret agents for the work on the theatre of operations beforehand. However, actually no steps had been taken in this direction. It is also unclear, why the Russian General Staff rejected the plan of reconnaissance operations, worked out by the Amur military district in 1902. The agents, who were urgently trained after the war had already started, were of little use in collecting information about the enemy, and ineffective work of the Russian intelligence service contributed to the defeat of Russia [5].

The Japanese victory weakened the positions of Russia in the Far East, thus forcing the tsarist government to go over to the policy of maintaining status quo in the region. After the Portsmouth peace treaty was signed, the Country of the Rising Sun more and more sought the leading role in Asia. Because both Russia and Japan were dissatisfied with the results of the recent war, and in the first month of peace both sides called for revenge, the Far East might become the scene of a new conflict in the near future. However, Russia and Japan managed to smooth over mutual contradictions and normalize bilateral relations. In many respects this was due to the fact, that Saint Petersburg and Tokyo had interests in common in the Far East.

The shift of the Russian foreign policy in the European direction in the postwar years was not possible without normalizing the Russo-Japanese relations. This settlement was vital for the security of the Far East territories of the Russian Empire (this was evident for the advocates of the pro-European political course - S.J. Vitte and A.P. Izvolsky) [6]. Japanese claims to the leading role in Asia and the consequent new differences with Washington and Great Britain forced Japan to reconsider its attitude towards the former enemy - Russia. In the new geopolitical situation in the Far East, Tokyo was more and more in needed of an ally in order to defend its interests in China.

However, even after setting its course for rapprochement with Russia, Japan didn't give up its old aggressive plans, including pretensions to Siberia and the Russian Far East. The analysis of the Japanese and Russian diplomatic and departmental correspondence allows to assert, that Tokyo had intention to take steps in this direction, depending on the development of events. At the minimum, Japan intended to completely take root in South Manchuria, at most - to add the territories of North Manchuria and Amur region to the Japanese Empire [7]. However, at that time the Japanese government had to be cautious, so that for a certain period not to damage Russo-Japanese relations, which started to improve in the postwar years. In many respects Japan's position in Asia depended on relations with Russia [8].

As the dialog between Sent-Petersburg and Tokyo gradually developed, and a number of formal agreements were concluded [9], the Japanese policy as to the Russian Far East took quite practical character: collecting all kinds of information, which could be useful in the future. The Japanese government took measures, aimed at detailed study of the Russian Far-East territories. It opened a number of Japanese schools in the Amur region, where they taught geography of this territory and Russian language [10]. According to the Russian press of that time, "the Japanese know our Amur region better, than our settlers know the central provinces" [11]. In Japan the newspaper "Siberia" was published. It contained information about the situation in the Russian Far East, its population, natural and mineral resources. The publisher of the newspaper was the Vladivostok correspondent of the "Osaka Asahi" - a certain Yasushimo, who received money from the Japanese government for collecting information for such publications. The newspaper "Osaka Asahi" had correspondents not only in the Russian Far East, but also in Sent-Petersburg, from which it received important information, concerning the Far East developments. In the first postwar years a lot of reference books about Russian Far East was published in Japan. Some data in these books were collected by means of spying. Thus, at one time the book of the Japanese consul in Harbin Mr. Kavakami "The Industry of North Manchuria" evoked special interest of the Russian counter-intelligence. The book was published on the money of the Japanese Foreign ministry and contained not only statistical data on economic situation in the Russian Far East, which could be found, for example, in the local press, but also classified information [12].

Along with the study of the Russian Far East, Japan continued to collect information of military nature. Since 1910 the Japanese intelligence activated its operations in the south of Primorie region and near the coast of Kamchatka. Since then the Russian border-guards regularly observed Chinese fishing boats with Japanese military man near Russian shores. Quite often local authorities detained the Japanese, dressed up as fishermen, and during the search they found cameras and topographical drawings with them. According to the Russian military in the region, at the observation post near the Posiet bay the naval telegraph often broke down due to unclear reasons [13]. The Russians didn't have direct proofs of the Japanese agents' participation in those technical troubles. However, the Japanese, apparently, were involved in these incidents, because telegraph communication became unstable after the Japanese agents appeared nearby, and possible cause of the malfunction might be attempts to connect up to the line in order to listen in to the conversations.

Actually every month the Russian counter-intelligence detained the Japanese on suspicion of espionage in Vladivostok, Irkutsk or Tchita [14]. For example, quite often the Japanese were detained in the environs of Vladivostok. Under the pretence of having a trip to the country, they tried to approach the military defense district, absolutely forbidden for the foreigners. When being searched, precise maps were often found with them, evidently meant for further sending to Tokyo. In the Archives of the Japanese foreign policy there is a lot of such maps with information on the strength and positions of the Russian military units in North Manchuria and in the Far East [15]. After the police arrested a number of the Japanese on suspicion of espionage, the Japanese community sent numerous angry letters to the local authorities and press. The Russian authorities were accused of improper treatment of the Japanese citizens, who, as they assert, never thought of doing anything illegal, but just wanted to have a trip to the country for a breath of fresh air [16]. The most active help to the Japanese, accused of espionage, came from their countryman, the commercial agent Kavakami Toshihino. One should note, that after the abrupt departure of Kavakami from Vladivostok three days before the start of the Russo-Japanese war, Russian counter-intelligence found in his house the scraps of papers, containing precise description of the distribution of the troops of the Vladivostok garrison. There were also statistical data on fortifications and mine-fields [17].

In the places, where it was difficult for the authorities to keep an eye on the movements of the Japanese agents, the latter scarcely disguised the real objectives of their activity. For example, according to many Chinese, who lived in the north-east of Manchuria (which was in the Russian sphere of interest), the Japanese agents collected information on the number and tonnage of the ships, sailing the Sungari river, and also about the river freight and the strength of the Russian troops in the area. Active operations of the Japanese agents and the subjects of their inquiries strengthened the suspicions of the Far East authorities, that Japan intended to get a grip of the Russian possessions and prepared to start navigation on Sungari [18]. Using the forged documents, Japanese fixed-post spies moved freely in the Russian Far East. They received information from the employees of the Japanese companies and local population. The Japanese were especially interested in the situation in the cities Tsitsikar, Hailar and on the Manchuria railway station [19].

The Japanese agents, who were sent to the regions of the North-East China and the cities of the Russian Far East, had the necessary training. Sometimes it was just a five-day course of training, where the future agents were taught only Russian letters and the military badges of rank and shoulder-straps. However, other agents finished special schools in Japan. Such spies knew several languages, including the European ones. Secret information was, usually, passed by coded letters and telegrams, as well as postcards. For example, marks by lines and dots were made on a postcard. These marks showed the direction of the movement of the Russian troops: at the upper part of the postcard - movement to the north, at the bottom of the postcard - to the south, at the right - to the east, ant the left - to the west. The strength of the troops was marked by the number of lines on the sides of a postcard: one line - battalion, two lines - division, three - corps. Sometimes, toilet soap was used to pass information: a cake of soap was cut in two pieces, the data were put inside, then the two pieces were put together and slightly soaped. It was hardly possible to notice anything wrong with this soap [20].

Evidently, the lessons of the "small victorious war" should have somehow brought down to earth many Russian military leaders and politicians, who hadn't taken Japan seriously before, and made them think about correcting the mistakes. However, the proper conclusions were not made quickly enough, which is evident from the fact, that some servicemen displayed negligence, as to the classified information. There were even some cases, when Russian serviceman sold secret documents. E.g., after repeated cases of disappearance of classified papers from the construction department of the Vladivostok fortress, local counter-intelligence sent captain Mikhailov to conduct investigation. To his surprise, captain managed to easily buy in the fortress the last plan of telegraph and telephone communications, as well as the schemes of the artillery batteries and minefields [21].

The cases of free access of the foreign citizens to the Vladivostok defense district also showed the lack of control over Russian military installations. For example, in February of 1913 the gendarmerie of the Ussuri railroad received information about the presence in the Vladivostok fortress of a great number of foreign workers, including the Chinese and Koreans - Japanese subjects. Further investigation showed, that all these workers appeared on the territory of the defense district with the assistance of Kuzminskie brothers, who had signed a contract with the engineering department for cleaning smoke-ducts in the Vladivostok fortress. Due to financial backing of the Chinese subject Lu Shu In, who lived in Vladivostok, Kuzminskie brothers quickly organized their business [22]. Apparently, they didn't bother about the fact, that foreign citizens were not allowed to visit Russian military bases. Chinese workers and Koreans - Japanese subjects, who came to Kuzminskie's office to apply for a job, showed faked passports, according to which they were Russian Koreans. Anyway, one could easily buy a passport in the office itself at the price of 15-30 roubles [23]. As soon as the technicalities with documents were settled, the faked passports were passed to the gendarmerie of the Vladivostok fortress for registration, and then those hired could get down to work. Old passports could be resold for several times to other groups of workers. Moreover, later the owners even ceased issuing passports, confining themselves to giving the workers only passes to the fortress, and one pass could be used by several different workers. The Kuzminskie's enterprise existed just for about two weeks. Counter-intelligence and gendarmerie investigated the case, made the searches and arrested 21 people, including Koreans - Japanese subjects, who took the opportunity of almost free access to the defense district for collecting intelligence data.

Although after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war Russia temporarily was forced to curtail pursuing active policy in the Far East, the tsarist government didn't actually give up intentions to regain the ground. Officially Saint Petersburg, seeing the Japanese preparations for annexing Korea, abruptly distanced itself from the attempts of the emperor Kojon to persuade Russia to intervene in the Japanese-Korean affairs. However the Japanese movement towards the borders of the Russian Empire certainly worried the tsarist government. The increasing anti-Japanese resistance in Korea was regarded in the Russian capital as a positive development and an opportunity to decrease the influence of Japan on the Korean Peninsular. That's why after 1910 not only ordinary Korean peasants and craftsmen, who fled to safety from the Japanese oppression, but also the participants of the Korean anti-Japanese resistance found asylum in the Russian Far East. At the south of Primorie region the "Independence detachments"(Tonnipkun") were deployed (formed by the Korean patriots Lee Siyon, Lee Donnyon and Lee Sanyon), and in the vicinity of Vladivostok the Korean family An Chun Gin lived, who assassinated the Japanese General resident in Korea Ito Hirobumi. Although officially Russian authorities didn't back up the leaders of the anti-Japanese resistance, they secretly helped them. The Korean insurgents were quartered at the Russian barracks, and they were trained by the Russian military instructors.

Naturally, the Far East authorities' tolerant attitude towards the Korean insurgents couldn't remain unnoticed by Tokyo. Although after the events of 1910 the movements for the independence of Korea spontaneously sprang up in the USA, China and Hawaii, the Japanese government (which won the right to rule in Korea at the cost of the murderous Russo-Japanese war) was especially troubled by the prospect of a new anti-Japanese opposition in Russia. Fearing, that the tsarist government might try to play the "Korean card" again, Tokyo undertook vigorous efforts to establish control over the Korean emigrants, settled down in the Russian Far East. To that end, on the eve of the annexation of Korea, the Japanese consulate-general in Vladivostok and Association of the Japanese residents managed to set up pro-Japanese societies, which kept an eye on the Koreans, who left Korea: the Society of progress (Iltchinhoi), the Popular society (Kukminhoi), the Society of the Korean residents (Tyosen kyoruminkai).

Besides keeping under observation the Korean community, one of the major tasks of those organizations was dissemination of the pro-Japanese ideas among the Koreans in the Far East [24]. Such propaganda produced results, since the Japanese government, which had plans about Russian Far East anyway, promised to give a lot of land to the Koreans in case of the Japanese annexation of the Russian territories [25]. Striving to attract the Koreans on its side, the Japanese government even made a promise to restore independence of Korea in case of annexation of the Amur region [26]. The Koreans - members of the Iltchinhoi - were also responsible for maintaining ties with khunhuzes. Quite often the Japanese agents were bound to take part in the robberies and raiding together with khunhuzes and "provoke all kinds of riots in order to set the Russians against the Koreans and the Chinese" [27]. From the start of the World War I, when most of the troops were moved from the Far East to Europe, it became even more difficult for the local authorities to keep law and order in the Amur region and in the Russian possessions in China. Situation was relatively calm only in the area of Chinese Eastern Railway (KVGD) as the most guarded installation in Manchuria. As to the other areas, the khunhuz gangs, numbering up to several hundred men, "constantly endangering people's life and property, sometimes attacked villages and even small towns" [28].

The Chinese were also subjected to such Japanese propaganda. One of the proclamations, addressed to the Chinese people (it was intercepted by the Russian counter-intelligence), said, that "if Japan, which has imposed its enslaving terms upon Peking, nevertheless acquires new rights in South Manchuria, Russia will stop at nothing to acquire the similar rights in North Manchuria" [29]. Thus, Russia - not Japan - was presented as a major enemy of China. Such propaganda recruited quite a number of followers among the Chinese. According to them, it was Russia (which, they believed, concluded a number of unequal treaties with Peking and deprived China of an outlet to the Japan sea), who was mainly responsible for the political and economic decline of their country.

A number of incidents proved the involvement of the Japanese intelligence in such propaganda; e.g., quite often Chinese agitators in their speeches mentioned top secret information on the strength of the Russian troops in the Far East and the overall condition of the Russian army. One of such incidents, which draw attention of the Russian counter-intelligence, took place in November of 1914 in the "Tae shun kuan" restaurant in the Vladivostok's China-town. At dinner-time, when there was a lot of customers in the restaurant, a Chinese appeared there and delivered a speech, in which he appealed to his compatriots to pay the Russians back for "all the insults since the Aigun treaty". According to that Chinese agitator, the condition of the Russian army was far from satisfactory, since Russia had bought from Japan 600,000 rifles, and from the start of the war in Europe 500,000 Russian troops were moved there from the Far East. This gave an opportunity of insurrection, providing several thousand Chinese troops would intrude the Far-East possessions of Russia [30].

The Chinese information on the strength of the Russian troops, moved from the Far East, and on the number of rifles, bought by the tsarist government from Tokyo, was absolutely true, although at that moment negotiations on the bargain were not finalized. Only the Tsarist government and the Japanese cabinet knew these data, and the documents on cooperation between Russia and Japan were published for the first time in the Soviet Union only in the 1930s, and much later - in the 1960s - in Japan [31]. Such information leak was scarcely probable from the Russian side. During the World War I all the military units received directions, ordering to be very careful while contacting with strangers, especially foreigners, in order to avoid information leaks, in particular, as for the distribution of troops and the security of the railways [32]. All the correspondence from the Far East was checked as to the possible disclosure of secret information, and at the slightest suspicion the letters were detained by military censorship. However, even the letters with reconnaissance data never contained exact figures of the strength of the Russian troops in the Far East, although their movements were closely watched by the foreign agents. For example, the letter, sent from the town of Serpukhov to the station Pogranichnaya KVGD, said: "The Siberian railway is filled with army trains, and there is actually no movement of the freight trains. Many troops are moved from the Far East; everyday about 10-20 military trains pass by our town to Russia (European part - Y.P.)" [33]. Judging from this and other similar letters, detained by the Russian counter-intelligence, the foreign agents in the Far East had to be content with just watching the movement of the Russian troops and on this basis to calculate their actual strength. Thus, there is a well-founded assumption, that the disclosure of information on the strength of the Russian troops and other classified data was initiated by the Japanese government.

There were different views among the Russian politicians on the strengthening of Japan's positions in the Far East and the activity of its intelligence in this region. E.g., the representative of the Russian Foreign ministry V.V. Grave after detailed study of the situation in the Far East possessions of Russia came to quite an unexpected conclusion, that the situation in the Russian Far East was rather stable, despite the evident Japanese desire to dominate in the region. According to V.V. Grave, the Japanese, who lived in the Russian Far East, presented less threat, in comparison with other ethnic groups, due to their relatively small number. Grave pointed out the importance of attracting the Russian population to the Far East and of cultural development of the Amur region by building schools. The Russian official also noted the importance of the rapid infrastructure development of the region, i.e., constructing roads and telegraph lines, organizing steamship communication between settlements, attracting Russian and foreign capital [34].

Such Russian political figures as P.F. Unterberger, P.L. Bark, Y.Y. Lyutsha called on the tsarist government not to rely too much on the friendship with Japan, but to take measures for military buildup in the Russian Far East [35].

Owing to a number of political reasons, which required to concentrate all efforts on the war in Europe, the tsarist government had to turn a blind eye on all the Japanese intrigues, though Russian counter-intelligence knew perfectly well, who incited the khunhuz gangs and provoked the anti-Russian propaganda among the Chinese and the Koreans, living in the Far East.

It is clear, why the Japanese government encouraged the khunhuz actions and intentionally fomented anti-Russian sentiments among the Chinese and Korean population. It expected, that in the situation of political instability the tsarist government, which had actually no troops in the Far East, would apply to Japan for military help. According to the diplomatic correspondence of the Japanese Foreign ministry, Isii Kikujiro insistently advised the Japanese ambassador in Russia Motono Itiro to explore the ground as to the possibility of moving the remaining Russian troops from the Far East to Europe, so that at the first opportunity to replace them by the Japanese troops. At the same time, Tokyo hypocritically asserted, that since the start of the World War I Japan constantly exerted efforts to maintain stability in Asia, especially in the Russian possessions in the Far East [36].

Besides, the increasing activity of the khunhuz gangs gave the Japanese government a chance to prove to the whole world, that Peking couldn't control the situation in its territory by itself, and, hence, the Japanese military presence there was necessary to maintain law and order. Thus, in 1916 Okuma Sigenobu put it frankly, that strengthening the Japanese military contingent in China pursued only one aim - to ensure territorial integrity of the country, since China was not able to do it by itself [37].

Changes of the Japanese Cabinets in 1906-1917 actually didn't affect the Tokyo's Far East Policy. Despite some similar foreign policy objectives of Japan and Russia, Saint Petersburg shouldn't have overestimated the significance of normalizing relations in that period. The events of 1918 proved, that neither relations of alliance, nor formal treaty could protect the Russian Far East from the Japanese aggression. Thus, the activities of the Japanese intelligence in the Far East possessions of Russia were a part of a general scheme to impose control over Siberia and the Far East. Japan was just waiting for an opportunity to move on from espionage and subversive activity to the direct annexation of the Russian land.



1. See: Masumi Junnosuke. Nihon seito siron (The History of the Political Parties of Japan). Tokyo, 1967, v.3, p. 134.

2. RSMHA, f. 2000, d. 1, doc. 29, s. 120.

3. "Morskoi sbornik". 1913, № 9, p. 125.

4. The Report of the military investigator of the 3-rd Manchurian army on the Japanese espionage. September 15, 1905. - Japanese Espionage in the Tsarist Russia. The Collection of documents. M., 1944. p.16.

5. See: Russian Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence in the War of 1904-1905. Documents. - Pavlov D.B., Petrov S.A. Japanese Money and Russian Revolution. M., 1993, p. 156.

6. See: Vitte S.J. Memoirs. Tallinn-Moscow, 1994, v. 3, p. 497.

7. The copy of the secret report of the Posiet police officer to the senior officer of the Nikolsk-Ussuri district. June 3, 1914. - The State archives of the Khabarovsk territory (SAKT). f. I16, d. 6, doc. 1, s. 268.

8. Mansu bunkatsu ron (Reflections about dividing Manchuria). August 1913. - The Archives of the foreign policy of Japan (Tokyo), f. Jai harupin soryojikan hokoku "Rokoku kyokuto seisaku kenkyu siryo" jakken (The collection of reports of the consulate-general from Harbin, entitled "Materials on the study of the Russian Far East policy").

9. The agreements, signed in 1907, 1910 and 1912, which delimited the spheres of influence of the two countries in Manchuria and Mongolia. See: Mo Shen. Japan in Manchuria. Analytical Study of Treaties and Documents. Manila., 1960, p. 35; Grimm E,D. The Collection of Treaties and other Documents on the History of International Relations in the Far East (1842-1925). M., 1927.

10. The Bulletin of the Foreign Literature. 1913, № 84. p. 21.

11. "Nash jurnal". 1910., № 7, p. 20.

12. Extract from the intelligence survey of the Trans-Amur border troops. November 9, 1909. - RSMHA, f. 2000, d. 1. doc. 29, s.81.

13. "China and Japan". November 18, 1910, №12, p. 39.

14. Labru A. The Japanese in Siberia and Manchuria. - "Novoe Slovo". 1913, №3, p. 86.

15. Hokumansyu rokoku guntai haiti (Distribution of the Russian Troops in North Manchuria). Data by December, 1916. - The Archives of the foreign policy of Japan (Tokyo), f. 5-2-15-27-1; Osyu senso no sai kosen kakkoku no kokujyo kankei jassan. Rokoku no bu (Documents on the situation in the countries, waging the war in Europe. Russian department).

16. "The Seoul Press". 10. 06. 1913.

17. Brief explanatory note about the system of the Japanese espionage, written by captain Mikhailov. July 28, 1906. - The Japanese Espionage in the Tsarist Russia, p. 26.

18. The copy of report of a secret agent from China. August 13, 1916. - RSMHA, f. 2000, d. 1. doc. 4167, s. 8.

19. Kantoto seifu rikugun sanbobu (Administration of the Kanto region - To the General Staff). October 16, 1915. - The Archives of the foreign policy of Japan (Tokyo), f. 5-2-15-27-1.

20. Lieutenant-colonel Nemisky - to Captain Postnikov. February 14, 1916. - SAKT, f. I 16, d. 6, doc. №2, s.17; Lieutenant-colonel Nemisky - to Captain Postnikov, October 24, 1916. - SAKT, f. I 16, d. 6, doc. №2, s. 204.

21. Brief explanatory note about the system of the Japanese espionage, written by captain Mikhailov. July 28, 1906. - The Japanese Espionage in the Tsarist Russia, pp. 24-25.

22. Captain Fioshin - to the Chief of the Gendermerie of the Ussuri railway. February 26, 1913. - The Japanese Espionage in the Tsarist Russia, pp. 164-166.

23. 30 roubles was the price of a passport with a long effective period. Otherwise it was twice as cheap.

24. The H.Q. of the Amur military district - to the Military Governor of the Primorie region. June 2, 1907. - SAKT (State archives of the Khabarovsk territory). f. I 16, d. 1, doc. 2, s. 74.

25. The report on the observation of the Japanese spies. April 30, 1909. - The Japanese Espionage in the Tsarist Russia, p. 106.

26. The secret report of the Posiet police officer to the senior officer of the Nikolsk-Ussuri district. June 3, 1914. - SAKT. f. I 16, d. 6, doc. 1, s. 268.

27. Intelligence survey of the H.Q. of the Amur military district. April 12, 1910. - RSMHA, f. 2000, d. 1, doc. 29, s. 105-106.

28. Kinney H. Modern Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway Company. Dairen, 1928, p. 42.

29. The assistant of the military agent in China - to the Commander of the Siberian flotilla. March 12, 1915. - Russian State Naval Archives (RSNA), f. 418, d. 2, doc. №248, s. 22.

30. Captain Nemisky - to the Chief of the Nikolaevsk-on-Amur fortress gendarmerie. December 6, 1914. - SAKT, f. I 16, d. 6, doc. №1a, s. 535.

31. See: International relations in the period of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments. M.-L., 1935-1937. - Nihon gaiko bunsyo (Japanese diplomatic documents) (1914-1917). Tokyo, 1966-1968.

32. To the commanding officer of the second detachment of the Trans-Amur district of the special corps of the border guard. January 3, 1915. - RSMHA, f. 2000, d. 1, doc. 3984, s. 4.

33. Colonel Nemisky - to Captain Postnikov. February 14, 1916. - SAKT, f. I 16, d. 6, doc. 2.

34. Grave V.V. The Chinese, the Koreans and the Japanese in the Amur region: The works of the Amur expedition, sent by the Imperial order. S-Pb., 1912, issue 11, p. 234. One should note, that such statements had been already made by the Russian officials before. However, they had actually no consequences. The local authorities had no resources even to stop the illegal import of alcohol across the Russo-Chinese border (its transparency was stressed even by the Japanese), to say nothing of taking specific measures to consolidate Russian positions in the Amur region. See: The Japanese consulate-general in Vladivostok - to the foreign minister of Japan Isii Kikujiro. March 30, 1916. - The Archives of the foreign policy of Japan (Tokyo), f. Enkaisyu e susei yunnyu kinsi ikken (The Cases of ban on imports of alcohol into Primorie).

35. P.F. Unterberger - to I.L. Goremikin. - International relations in the period of imperialism. Series III. M.-L., 1935, vol. VII, part 1, p. 469; Y.Y. Lyutsha - to S.D. Sazonov. June 30, 1915. - International relations in the period of imperialism. Series III. M.-L., 1935, vol. VIII, part 1, pp. 86-87; P.L. Bark - to S.D. Sazonov. August 17, 1915. - International relations in the period of imperialism. Series III. M.-L., 1935, vol. VIII, part 2, pp. 94-96.

36. Isii - to Motono. February 15, 1916. Japanese diplomatic documents (1916), vol. 1, p. 120.

37. "Okuma Urges Army Increase". 23.06.1916. - The Archives of the foreign policy of Japan (Tokyo), f. 1.1.4/1-2. Teikoku syogaikoku gaiko kankei jassan. Nitirokan (The survey of documents on diplomatic relations of the Japanese Empire with other countries. Japan-Russian relations).
Последнее обновление ( 10.01.2013 г. )
« Пред.   След. »
Институт Дальнего Востока РАН